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Direct and Indirect Bargaining Costs and the Scope of the Firm
We compare the magnitude of bargaining costs within and between firms.  The results are
derived from a unique dataset comparing internal and external transactions for the same
categories of parts at a single high-technology firm.  They confirm that direct bargaining costs
are higher with external suppliers, at least in part because there is more to bargain over.  The
need to negotiate price and formal contracts typically leads to longer ex ante negotiations and an
increased likelihood of ex post renegotiations when circumstances change.  We also observed
higher indirect bargaining costs with external suppliers.  The introduction of procurement
specialists to external supply relationships disperses information and decision-making more
widely across the organization.  Moreover, information that may hinder contractual negotiations
is often either suppressed or delayed and, because engineers are unable or unwilling to enforce
these information restrictions, all communication with external suppliers passes through
procurement personnel.  The data suggests that these differences greatly hinder coordination and
contribute to the determination of which parts are made internally versus externally.
